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Privileged Communications: Waiver of a Corporate
Debtor's Attorney-Client Privilege by the Trustee
In Bankruptcy
The privilege prohibiting disclosure of communications between attorney
and client is the oldest recognized evidentiary privilege.' The elements necessary
to claim the privilege have been clearly identified.' The privilege has been
expanded to include an attorney's representatives. 3 It has been restricted to
communications made outside the presence of third parties,4 and also excludes
communications made for the purpose of committing a crime or a tort.'
The attorney-client privilege is based on the public policy belief that sound
legal advice serves the public interest by promoting the observance of law
and the administration of justice.6 This goal is necessarily dependent upon
full and frank communications between attorneys and their clients.' In order
to maximize this freedom of consultation, the fear of compelled disclosures
must be removed.'
Such compelled disclosures may exist, in violation of public policy, if the
trustee in bankruptcy can waive the corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege
for the benefit of third parties. The bankruptcy trustee is obliged to max-
imize recovery of the bankrupt estate for the benefit of creditors.' In order
to discharge this duty, the trustee must investigate the debtor's affairs to deter-
mine possible sources of additional recoveries,' such as avoidable preferences
or fraudulent transfers. ' The trustee could seek to waive the debtor's attorney-
client privilege in order to gain potentially valuable information, not available
elsewhere, concerning these sources of recovery. This note will analyze recent
conflicting decisions concerning the trustee's power to waive this privilege.' 2
1. 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961) See also Young v. Taylor,
466 F.2d 1329, 1332 (10th Cir. 1972); sources, infra note 13.
2. WloaioR, supra note 1, § 2292.
3. Jarvis, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 84 F.R.D. 286, 289 (D. Colo. 1979); United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950).
4. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950).
5. Id.; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Vargas, 723 F.2d 1461, 1467 (10th Cir. 1983).
6. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
7. Id.
8. WiGMORE, supra note 1, § 2291.
9. Freeman v. Seligson, 405 F.2d 1326, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (the trustee is under a duty
to maximize the realization on liquidation of the estate); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Skutt,
341 F.2d 177, 181 (8th Cir. 1965) (the trustee is an officer of the court and a representative
of all creditors, with the duty to realize the maximum from the estate for distribution to the
creditors).
10. See infra text accompanying note 38.
11. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text. See also 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982), which
defines avoidable preferences, and 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982), which defines avoidable fraudulent
transfers.
12. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 722 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1984) (disal-
lowed the trustee's waiver based primarily on a "chilling effect" theory); Weissman v. Hassett
(In re O.P.M. Leasing Serv., Inc.), 670 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1982) (allowed the trustee's waiver
based on absence of officers and directors of the debtor corporation and limited the holding
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Because the Tenth Circuit has not addressed this issue, the note will also explore
its opinions on related issues and attempt to provide some indication of how
the court may decide this issue.
For the sake of brevity, several presumptions are made throughout this note.
The validity of the attorney-client relationship 3 itself and the appointment
of the trustee in accordance with applicable law 4 will not be questioned. Any
reference to waiver presumes the validity of the waiver in all respects other
than who may waive.'
5
Waiver
Waiver, in general, is defined as "the intentional relinquishment or aban-
donment of a known right or privilege."' 6 This definition, however, fails to
clarify what actions constitute a relinquishment or abandonment. 7 For policy
reasons, waiver of the attorney-client privilege is generally disfavored, absent
a clear intent to waive or actions clearly inconsistent with the privilege.' 8
Even if validity of the waiver is presumed, the question of who "owns"
the privilege, i.e., who may waive it, remains unanswered. In general, the
attorney-client privilege belongs to the client 9 and may be asserted or waived
either by the client or by the attorney on the client's behalf." The power
to waive the privilege may also be exercised by the executor or administrator
of a deceased client's estate,2 ' or by the assignee of a client's interest," at
to the specific facts of the case); Citibank, N.A. v. Andros, 666 F.2d 1192 (8th Cir. 1981) (allowed
the trustee's waiver based on the theory that the power to assert or waive the privilege passes
with the property of the debtor's estate to the trustee); Ross v. Popper, 9 Bankr. 485 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1980) (disallowed waiver based on a conflict of interest theory).
13. See generally Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); Gergacz, Attorney-Corporate
Client Privilege: Cases Applying Upjohn, Waiver, Crime-Fraud Exception, and Related Issues,
38 Bus. LAW. 1653 (1983); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Corporate Client: Where
Do We Go After Upjohn?, 81 MicH. L. REv. 665 (1983); Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for
Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 HAgv. L. REv. 424 (1970).
14. 11 U.S.C. §§ 702, 1104 (1982) (providing the mechanism by which a Chapter 7 trustee
is elected or a Chapter 11 trustee is appointed).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 19-29.
16. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); United States v. Dressel, 742 F.2d 1256,
1258 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Rich, 589 F.2d 1025, 1032 (10th Cir. 1978).
17. For good general discussions of the acts that may constitute waiver, see Note, When
Does a Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege Occur?, 24 B.C.L. Rav. 1283 (1983)
and Note, Corporate Disclosure and Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 50 Go.
WASH. L. REv. 812 (1982).
18. See generally Note, Inadvertent Disclosure of Documents Subject to the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 82 MicH. L. Ray. 598 (1983).
19. WIOMORE, supra note 1, § 2321.
20. Id. § 2324; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Vargas, 723 F.2d 1461, 1466 (10th Cir. 1983).
21. WiGmoRE, supra note 1, § 2329; Glover v. Patten, 165 U.S. 394, 407-08 (1897); Doherty
v. Fairall, 413 F.2d 381, 382 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
22. WiGMoRE, supra note 1, § 2328; Weissman v. Hassett (In re O.P.M. Leasing Serv., Inc.),
13 Bankr. 54, 59 n.10 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981); Buuck v. Kruckeberg, 121 Ind. App. 262, 271,
95 N.E.2d 304, 308 (1950).
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least to the extent the confidential communications affect the interest of the
estate 23 or the realization of the interest transferred from the client to the
assignee. 2 Thus, if the bankruptcy trustee is properly characterized as an
executor or administrator, or as an assignee of the debtor's interest, it seems
clear that the trustee can waive the debtor's attorney-client privilege when
it is in the bankrupt estate's best interest.2"
Supreme Court Standard 503 (Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503)
specifically addresses this question: "The [attorney-client] privilege may be
claimed by the client, his guardian or conservator, the personal representatives
of a deceased client, or the successor, trustee, or similar representative of
a corporation, association, or other organization, whether or not in exis-
tence. ' 26 Although standard 503 has not been enacted by the United States
Congress, one court held it to be a "fairly authoritative source of the federal
law." ' 27 On its face, it addresses only the power to claim the privilege, not
the power to waive it. One court, however, has interpreted standard 503 as
encompassing not only the claim of privilege but its waiver as well,2" and
another court used the standard as the rationale for allowing the bankruptcy
trustee to waive the debtor's attorney-client privilege. 29 The Supreme Court
standard is not sufficiently clear on its face to be dispositive of this question.
The standard likewise has not been interpreted consistently and therefore must
be viewed in combination with other applicable law.
Proper analysis of the propriety of the bankruptcy trustee's waiver of the
debtor's attorney-client privilege must include examination of statutes relating
to the trustee's duties and powers. This issue has precipitated court opinions
based on a variety of theories that may conflict with the statutory mandates.3"
Therefore, examination of these opinions and their theories is necessary to
properly resolve this issue. Similarly, it is helpful to investigate other con-
siderations which have not been articulated by these courts and possible com-
promise positions.
23. WIOMORE, supra note 1, § 2329; Glover v. Patten, 165 U.S. 394, 407 (1897).
24. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2328; Weissman v. Hassett (In re O.P.M. Leasing Serv., Inc.),
13 Bankr. 54, 59 n.10 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981); Buuck v. Kruckeberg, 121 Ind. App. 262, 266,
95 N.E.2d 304, 308 (1950).
25. The Bankruptcy Code characterizes the trustee as a "representative of the bankrupt estate."
11 U.S.C. § 323(a) (1982).
26. S. CT. STD. 503 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court and the Judicial Conference
Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence originally proposed thirteen rules of privilege to Con-
gress. Congress enacted only an amended version of rule 501, covering privilege in general terms.
The remaining twelve rules, covering specific privileges, became Supreme Court Standards, without
force of law. However, since the Advisory Committee was basically restating federal law in the
standards, they remain a convenient, comprehensive guide to the existing federal law of privileges.
See generally 2 J. WanVismn' & M. BERGER, WEINsTEI's EVIDENCE 501103] (1982), for a discus-
sion of the circumstances and rationale surrounding the rejection by Congress of the Supreme
Court Standards, as well as their current status. Supreme Court standard 503 is also the text,
in part, of Oklahoma's attorney-client privilege. 12 OKRA. STAT. § 2502(c) (1981).
27. United States v. DeLillo, 448 F. Supp. 840, 842 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
28. Id.
29. In re Crescent Beach Inn, 37 Bankr. 894 (Bankr. D. Me. 1984).
30. See supra note 12.
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Trustee's Duties
The Bankruptcy Code3 imposes upon the trustee in bankruptcy a duty to
investigate, examine, and otherwise manage the debtor's estate. A trustee's
investigative duties are broad and may be in the nature of a fishing expedition."
The court should balance the trustee's function to expose bad faith conduct
by the debtor against the possible invasion of the debtor's privacy," and give
the trustee greater latitude if questionable conduct is shown.3 ' Additional
statutory duties include, without limitation, accountability for the property
of the estate, 35 investigation of the debtor's financial affairs3 6 and transmis-
sion of information regarding the estate to parties in interest.3 7
Proper investigation of the debtor's activities and affairs necessarily requires
examination of the debtor's acts, property, and financial condition as pro-
vided by the Bankruptcy Code. 3i Bankruptcy rule 2004(b) expressly limits exam-
ination to matters concerning the debtor, apparently providing protection to
a corporate officer's individual privilege, as opposed to the privilege held by
the corporation itself,39 thereby eliminating the danger that the trustee's waiver
could be used for a "back door" investigation of a corporate officer's private
affairs.
31. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1146 (1982). Although the Bankruptcy Code was revised in 1984, no
sections discussed herein were affected by the revision.
32. In re Vantage Pet. Corp., 34 Bankr. 650, 651 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983), See also In re
South State Street Bldg. Corp., 105 F.2d 680, 682 (7th Cir. 1939) (Proper performance of the
trustee's duties requires a "comprehensive and searching investigation into all phases of the business
affairs and operations of the debtor corporation.").
33. In re Vantage Pet. Corp., 34 Bankr. 650, 651 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983).
34. Id. See also Austrian v. Williams, 198 F.2d 697, 702 (2d Cir. 1952) (one purpose of
the trustee's investigatory powers is to aid in the exposure of corporate abuses).
35. 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(2), 1106(a)(1) (1982). Section 704(2) provides that "the trustee shall
be accountable for all property received." Section 1106(a)(1) makes § 704(2) applicable to Chapter
11 proceedings.
36. 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(3), 1106(a)(3) (1982). Section 704(3) provides that "the trustee shall
investigate the financial affairs of the debtor." Section 1106(a)(3) provides that the trustee shall
investigate the debtor's affairs, as well as the operation of the debtor's business, the desirability
of the business' continuance, and any other matter relevant to the case or to the formulation
of a plan.
37. 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(6), 1106(a)(1), 1106(a)(4) (1982). Section 704(6) provides that "the trustee
shall, unless the court orders otherwise, furnish such information concerning the estate and the
estate's administration as is requested by a party in interest." Section 1 106(a)(1) makes § 704(6)
applicable to Chapter 11 proceedings. Section 1106(a)(4) provides that the trustee shall file a
statement of the results of his investigation, including any findings of irregularities in the manage-
ment of the debtor's affairs, and shall transmit this statement to various parties in interest.
38. 11 U.S.C. § 343 (1982), which provides: "the debtor shall appear and submit to examina-
tion under oath at the meeting of creditors under section 341(a) of this title. Creditors, any
indenture trustee, or any trustee or examiner in the case may examiner [sic] the debtor." See
also BANXR. R. PRAc. & PROC. 2004, which provides that the court may order the examination
of any person. This examination may extend only to the debtor's affairs or matters which may
affect the administration of the debtor's estate, including, in reorganization cases, matters relating
to the operation of the debtor's business or to the formulation of a plan.
39. See also 11 U.S.C. § 541(b) (1982), which provides that "property of the estate does
not include any power that the debtor may exercise solely for the benefit of an entity other
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A variety of situations may arise in which the trustee might seek to discover
confidential communications between the debtor and his attorney. For example,
the debtor's attorney may be the best, and possibly the only, source of infor-
mation to determine whether attorney fees constitute a preference or fraudulent
transfer,4" or whether attorney fees paid by a debtor corporation are for the
benefit of the corporation or an individual officer.' Likewise, the debtor's
counsel may hold valuable information concerning the validity of the deb-
tor's counterclaims against a judgment creditor.4 2 The attorney's knowledge
might also be needed to assist the trustee in the management of the debtor's
business in a Chapter 11 proceeding.43
While the Code expressly authorizes the court to order production of
documents by a debtor's attorney, such order is "subject to any applicable
privilege." '44 This provision's stated purpose is to deprive an attorney (or other
professional) of the preferential treatment available under state law lien
provisions.42 The extent to which the attorney-client privilege is valid against
the trustee is admittedly unclear and is not discussed by the drafters of the
Code. While "applicable privilege" is not defined in the Code, the Committee
Note accompanying this Code section uses the attorney-client privilege as the
only example.
4
1
Established Judicial Theories
Waiver of the debtor's attorney-client privilege by an assignee of the debtor
was denied in England as early as 1831 . 4 The English court gave little ra-
tionale for the denial, but it was apparently based on rather vague policy
grounds. This issue has since been addressed in both the bankruptcy and district
courts in the United States.
Conflict of Interest Theory
Before 1984 there was only one case in which the trustee attempted to waive
the debtor's attorney-client privilege, and the court failed to allow the waiver.
than the debtor." In re Tom Woods Used Cars, Inc., 24 Bankr. 529 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn! 1982)
(trustee acquires no greater interest than the debtor has in the debtor's property).
40. Turner v. Davis, Gillenwater & Lynch (In re Investment Bankers, Inc.), 30 Bankr. 883
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1983). The Code expressly provides for examination of the propriety of attorneys'
fees in 11 U.S.C. §§ 329, 502(b)(5) (1982), and BANKR. R. PRAc. & PROC. 2017.
41. In re National Trade Corp., 28 Bankr. 872 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983).
42. Id.
43. Weissman v. Hassett (In re O.P.M. Leasing Serv., Inc.), 670 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1982).
44. 11 U.S.C. § 542(e) (1982), which provides: "Subject to any applicable privilege, after
notice and a hearing, the court may order an attorney, accountant, or other person that holds
recorded information, including books, documents, records, and papers, relating to the debtor's
property or financial affairs, to disclose such recorded information to the trustee."
45. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 84, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONo. & AD.
NEws 5787, 5870.
46. Id.
47. Bowman v. Norton, 172 Eng. Rep. 929 (1831).
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The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
disallowed the trustee's waiver in Ross v. Popper," based on a conflict of
interest theory. The court held that because the trustee represents primarily
the general creditors, whose interests are adverse to those of the debtor as
well as those of the secured creditors, waiver of the attorney-client privilege
by the trustee for the benefit of general creditors could operate to the detri-
ment of the other parties."9 Because the attorney-client communications sought
to be discovered occurred prior to bankruptcy, the beneficiary of the com-
munications was the bankrupt corporation. Thus, waiver of the privilege by
one with adverse interests, e.g., the trustee, should not have been allowed. 0
However, the Ross court cited no authority in support of this theory. Although
the conflict of interest rationale of Ross seems to be well reasoned and com-
pelling, the fear of creating unwarranted preferences could be overridden by
the trustee's general responsibility to administer the estate in an evenhanded
manner. The trustee holds a fiduciary position with an obligation to treat
all parties fairly.
5'
Property of the Estate Theory
The issue of whether a trustee may waive a corporate debtor's attorney-
client privilege first reached a United States court of appeals in 1981, produc-
ing the opinion that generally governed this issue in lower courts until 1984.52
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals allowed the trustee's waiver based
primarily on the concept that the power to waive the privilege passes to the
trustee with the property of the debtor's estate.3
In the trustee's examination of the debtor under rule 205(a) of the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,5 4 the trustee in Citibank, N.A. v. Andros"
sought to waive the corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege to afford the
principal secured creditor access to documents held by the debtor's attorney.
The court, in allowing the trustee to waive the privilege, reasoned that because
the Bankruptcy Act vests broad powers in the trustee to manage the debtor's
affairs, and because the power to waive the corporate attorney-client privilege
belongs to the corporate management, the right to assert or waive the privilege
passes to the trustee with the property of the corporate debtor. 6
48. 9 Bankr. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
49. Id. at 487. Cf. In re Mori, I Bankr. 265 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1979) (accountant-client privilege,
if allowed, would severely prejudice creditors).
50. Ross v. Popper, 9 Bankr. 485, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
51. Wolf v. Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633 (1963). See also Walker v. Steele, 26 Bankr. 233 (Bankr.
W.D. Ky. 1982) (trustee must be "scrupulously impartial").
52. Citibank, N.A. v. Andros, 666 F.2d 1192 (8th Cir. 1981).
53. Id. at 1195.
54. Examination of parties is now covered by BANKR. R. PRAC. & PROC. 2004.
55. 666 F.2d 1192 (8th Cir. 1981).
56. Id. at 1195. The property of the debtor is now covered by 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1982). The
Second Circuit also allowed the trustee's waiver in Weismann v. Hassett (In re O.P.M. Leasing
Serv., Inc.), 670 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1982), but limited its holding to the facts of the case. The
court expressly declined to decide whether the attorney-client privilege passes by operation of
law to the trustee. Though not critical of Citibank, the court failed to expressly adopt its reason-
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The court also relied on Supreme Court standard 503(c) as "a source of
federal common law" that would clearly allow the waiver."7 In response to
the argument that standard 503(c) does not contemplate a waiver of this nature,
the court looked to the legislative history of the Code provision for privilege
in general, 58 which indicates that the privilege provision was enacted to pre-
vent attorneys and accountants from withholding documents to obtain prior-
ity in bankruptcy," and apparently concluded that section 542(e) was enacted
for no other purpose than to eliminate preferences created in favor of at-
torneys and accountants by state lien statutes. If the Citibank court is correct
in its apparent assumption that Congress intended only one interpretation for
the Code section dealing with privilege, 6 then a broad application of the
attorney-client privilege would be unwarranted. It may, however, also be un-
warranted to assume that, because Congress stated only one purpose for 542(e),
in intended to exclude all others.
Chilling Effect Theory
In early 1984 the Seventh Circuit cast serious doubts on the Citibank court's
reasoning in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub.6' The
court was highly critical of Citibank and its lack of supporting authority.62
The Seventh Circuit declined to follow either of the prior appellate decisions
and reversed a district court ruling allowing a trustee's waiver of a debtor's
attorney-client privilege. Commodity Futures is somewhat more analytical than
prior cases on this issue, offering four basic rationales for denying the trustee's
waiver.
61
First, the court reasoned that although the trustee has broad management
powers, the bankrupt corporation continues to exist and is still capable of
performing many functions. Thus, the trustee does not have absolute control
over the corporation's legal rights and does not replace the corporation as
an entity.64 Second, while an individual debtor may assert privileges during
the trustee's examination, 65 the trustee's waiver of these privileges would deny
the same right to the corporate debtor. This would result in unequal treat-
ment between individual and corporate debtors. 66 As a related consideration,
ing. In O.P.M. where all officers and directors of the debtor corporation had resigned, the power
to assert or waive the attorney-client privilege passed to the trustee "by virtue of the non-existence
of any other entity authorized to so act." Id. at 387. This limitation renders O.P.M. virtually
useless as precedent applicable to other fact situations.
57. Citibank, N.A. v. Andros, 666 F.2d 1192, 1195 (8th Cir. 1981).
58. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
59. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 84, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5787, 5870.
60. Citibank, N.A. v. Andros, 666 F.2d 1192, 1195 (8th Cir. 1981).
61. 722 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1984).
62. Id. at 342.
63. Id. at 342-43.
64. Id. at 342.
65. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
66. However, § 542(e) does not draw the distinction between individual and corporate debtors
in conditioning the production of information upon applicable privilege. This section refers only
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the court viewed the "erosion" of the corporation's attorney-client privilege
based on the economic status of the corporation as discriminatory. A solvent
corporation may freely assert or waive its attorney-client privilege, but upon
entering bankruptcy the privilege would be lost to the trustee, thereby
discriminating against a corporate debtor solely on the basis of economic
status.6" The final consideration, and the one the Seventh Circuit considered
most important, is the potential chilling effect on attorney-client relations.6"
The policy basis for the privilege is poorly served by allowing waiver by the
trustee. Corporate clients would be hesitant to communicate openly with their
attorneys for fear that the communications would be open to public scrutiny
in subsequent bankruptcy proceedings.
Commodity Futures, despite its persuasive discussion of policy, may be
flawed in other ways.6 9 In discussing the trustee's powers, the court concen-
trated primarily on the management powers, giving only cursory considera-
tion to the investigative duties of the trustee, which comprise a major portion
of the Code sections concerning trustee's duties."°
Tenth Circuit Posture
The Tenth Circuit has not yet addressed the specific issue of a bankruptcy
trustee's power to waive a debtor's attorney-client privilege. Though the Tenth
Circuit certainly recognizes the privilege,7' it has had few opportunities to
explore its intricacies. The court also recognizes that the attorney-client privilege
is to be narrowly construed,'72 and there is some evidence of the court's move-
ment toward a more expansive view of what constitutes waiver of the
privilege,' 7 although questions relating to the ownership of the privilege re-
main unanswered.
Based on existing law in the Tenth Circuit, the court could allow the trustee's
waiver under two distinct theories: (1) the Citibank view of the power to waive
to the debtor's property. "Debtor" is defined by the Code to include both individuals and cor-
porations. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(12), 101(30) (1982).
67. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 722 F.2d 338, 343 (7th Cir. 1984).
68. Id.
69. The unequal treatment and discrimination theories seem somewhat cumulative and appear
to be subordinate to the court's reliance on the chilling effect theory.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 32-36.
71. Young v. Taylor, 466 F.2d 1329, 1332 (10th Cir. 1972); Wilcoxon v. United States, 231
F.2d 384, 386 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 943 (1956).
72. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 697 F.2d 277, 278 (10th Cir. 1983).
73. In Blankenship v. Rowntree, 219 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1955), the court took a very restric-
tive view of waiver, holding that delivery of a document by a client to a third party for subse-
quent transmission to an attorney did not constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.
Twenty-four years later, in United States v. Bump, 605 F.2d 548 (10th Cir. 1979), the court
adopted a more expansive (and more traditional) view, holding that the privilege is waived when
a client voluntarily reveals otherwise confidential information to a third party, or when the attorney
reveals the information to a third party with the client's consent. See also In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, Vargas, 723 F.2d 1461 (10th Cir. 1983) (an attorney cannot waive the attorney-
client privilege without the client's consent, but production of privileged documents under a court
order does not necessarily constitute a waiver of the privilege).
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NOTES
passing with the property of the estate to the trustee, or (2) implicit adoption
of Supreme Court standard 503 as a rule of evidence. There are apparently
no decisions in the Tenth Circuit that indicate its willingness to disallow the
trustee's waiver, barring adoption on policy grounds of the Ross court's con-
flict of interest theory or the Commodity Futures court's chilling effect theory.
There are likewise no decisions evincing the court's movement in this direction.
Allowance of the trustee's waiver under Citibank's property of the debtor
theory would be greatly affected by the Tenth Circuit's definition of "pro-
perty." Both the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit have held that the
word "property," when used without qualification, may reasonably include
obligations, rights, and other intangibles, as well as physical things.74 A logical
extension of this concept supports the conclusion that the attorney-client
privilege does not merely pass to the trustee with the property of the estate,
but is in fact property of the estate. If the privilege itself constitutes property
of the estate rightfully passing to the trustee, there is no question that the
trustee would also possess the right to assert or waive it.
The Tenth Circuit could also allow the trustee's waiver based on an inter-
pretation of Supreme Court standard 503.1 5 In 1983 the Tenth Circuit im-
plicitly adopted Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 512,7 6 holding that
"although Congress did not enact Rule 512, it still has utility as a standard
of law on the privileges that should be applied in federal courts."" Although
rule 512 is inapplicable to the present discussion, its approval by the Tenth
Circuit demonstrates the court's willingness to give the force of law to the
proposed rule. This lays a doctrinal foundation for the court's adoption of
Supreme Court standard (Proposed Rule) 503. As discussed earlier, standard
503 was used by another court to allow the trustee to waive the debtor's
attorney-client privilege.
7 8
The issue presented here has been considered only once by a district court
within the jurisdiction of the Tenth Circuit. In 1983 the Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Colorado reached a compromise position when faced with
the trustee's attempted waiver of the debtor's attorney-client privilege. 79 Though
the court approved an examination of the purportedly privileged materials
and a deposition of the debtor's attorneys, it did so with the recognition that
the attorney-client privilege of the individuals is subject to some protection.8
74. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Arenz, 290 U.S. 66, 68 (1933); Jones v. Corbyn, 186
F.2d 450, 452 (10th Cir. 1950); Citizens State Bank v. Vidal, 114 F.2d 380, 382-83 (10th Cir. 1940).
75. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
76. FED. R. Evn. 512 (not enacted) provides: "Evidence of a statement or other disclosure
of privileged matter is not admissible against the holder of the privilege if the disclosure was
(a) compelled erroneously or (b) made without opportunity to claim the privilege."
77. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Vargas, 723 F.2d 1461, 1466 n.4 (10th Cir. 1983).
78. In re Crescent Beach Inn, 37 Bankr. 894 (Bankr. D. Me. 1984), discussed supra at text
accompanying note 29.
79. Turner v. Davis, Gillenwater, & Lynch (In re Investment Bankers, Inc.), 30 Bankr. 883
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1983).
80. Id. at 887. While the court relied heavily on Citibank to approve the examination, it
cited no authority for the confidential manner of production.
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The documents and testimony were maintained on a confidential basis, under
seal, with access to them limited to the parties and their counsel.
Conclusion
The obvious conflict between statutory mandates and established policy
presented by the question of whether the bankruptcy trustee may waive the
debtor's attorney-client privilege is not easily resolved. Although the policy
considerations advanced by the Commodity Futures court are compelling, the
failure of the Seventh Circuit to consider the investigatory duties of the
bankruptcy trustee remains unexplained. It seems unlikely that Congress would
devote such attention to the trustee's investigative duties in bankruptcy8' with
the intent that these duties be curtailed by the single reference to "applicable
privilege" in section 542(e) of the Code.
2
The chilling effect rationale used by the Commodity Futures court is a very
real concern and is precisely why the law on this issue needs to be settled.
The conflict with seemingly established authority created by the Commodity
Futures opinion will only lead to confusion in those circuits that have not
addressed the issue, and could lead to forum shopping by potential debtors.
However, from a practical standpoint, it seems unlikely that any real chilling
effect will be felt from a fear of disclosure in bankruptcy because few businesses
plan to become involved in bankruptcy proceedings. Should universal allowance
of the trustee's waiver occur, it would, especially in the case of voluntary
bankruptcies, be just another consideration when deciding whether and when
to file. 3
The potential value to the trustee of the power to waive the debtor's attorney-
client privilege is great, especially in terms of efficiency of administration.
The debtor's attorney would often be the best source of information concern-
ing both the debtor's financial affairs and its pre-petition transactions. Fur-
thermore, the failure to afford the trustee access to all necessary information
and to allow the debtor to retain control of information could limit the im-
partiality of administration of the estate and allow concealment of pertinent
facts. Retention of the attorney-client privilege by the debtor could seriously
encumber complete administration by allowing the debtor alternatively to waive
or to assert the privilege when in its best interest, as opposed to the best in-
terest of the estate.
Two other important considerations bear notice. Waiver of the attorney-
client privilege by the trustee applies only to the privilege formerly held by
the debtor corporation, thereby maintaining protection of the privilege held
by individual officers and directors. 84 Protection is also afforded the attorney's
pecuniary interest because the attorney's retaining lien may not be disturbed
by the trustee's investigation.15 Presumably, the lien would remain intact
regardless of the depth of the trustee's investigation. These considerations
81. See supra text accompanying notes 32-36.
82. See supra note 44.
83. However, the fear of disclosure and its concomitant chilling effect may increase when
a corporation encounters financial difficulties and bankruptcy is imminent.
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perhaps "soften the blow" to debtors and their attorneys of the apparently
well-reasoned conclusion that the power to waive the attorney-client privilege
is a proper and necessary tool of the bankruptcy trustee, well supported by
statutory authority.
It is possible that an across-the-board allowance of the trustee's waiver could
lead in certain cases to a "creditor's bonanza." When utilized in conjunction
with the express investigatory powers held by the trustee, it could conceivably
lead to larger recoveries by the estate and, consequently, larger recoveries by
creditors.
Although existing authority apparently authorizes the trustee's waiver, this
does not preclude compromise positions that may accomplish the goals of
disclosure while maintaining some degree of confidentiality. Restriction of
access to privileged materials, as in In re Investment Bankers,"' is an ideal
vehicle by which the trustee may compel maximum disclosure with minimum
intrusion into the privilege.
Another approach, not yet considered by any court, could be a require-
ment that the trustee make some showing of the value of the potential benefit
that may be realized by the estate through examination of privileged informa-
tion held by debtor's counsel. This approach may be opposed on the grounds
that it attaches a price tag to the privilege. However, it would certainly pre-
vent intrusion for de minimis gains to the estate.87
James A. Moomaw
Editor's Note: Subsequent to this note's completion, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to review Commodity Futures. 105 S. Ct. 321
(1984). On April 29, 1985, a unanimous Court (Powell, J., did not participate)
reversed the Second Circuit in Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Wein-
traub, 105 S. Ct. 1986 (1985), holding that the trustee of a corporation in
bankruptcy has the power to waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege
with respect to prebankruptcy communications. The Court rejected the con-
flict of interest, discrimination, and chilling effect theories, and based its deci-
sion generally on the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code, the manage-
ment duties of the trustee, and the trustee's fiduciary capacity. The Court also
noted the potential for abuses should the power to assert or waive the privilege
remain with the corporation's officers and directors.
84. See supra text accompanying note 39.
85. In re Life Imaging Corp., 31 Bankr. 101 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983). But cf. In re Beef
'n Burgundy, Inc., 21 Bankr. 69 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982) (where information held by debtor's
attorney was essential to the administration of the estate, the debtor's attorney must produce
the information pending satisfaction of the attorney's lien).
86. 30 Bankr. 883 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983). Discussed supra at text accompanying note 79.
87. However, the trustee may be required to investigate, regardless of value. See supra text
accompanying notes 32-34.
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